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CONFIDENTIALITY AND CRIMINOLOGICAL RESEARCH: THE EVOLVING
BODY OF LAW*
CHARLES R. KNERR** AND JAMES D. CARROLL***
Criminal justice researchers often enter into confidential relationships with their research subjects
In attitudinal research, personality testing or observation of subjects, confidentiality may be promised to a subject by a criminologist. In acquiring
information from archival sources, or in securing
information from informants knowledgeable in the
affairs, attitudes, beliefs or behavior of a subject, a
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'See, e.g., REIss, THE POLICE
ANDrHE PUBLIC (1971);
SKOLNICK, JUSTIrCE WrIHOur TRIAL (1966); Wolfgang,
Ethical Issues of Research in Criminology, in SOCIAL RESEARCH IN CONFLICr WrIH LAW AND ETHICS 23 (P.
Nejelski ed. 1976); Bailey & Lott, Crime, Punishment and
Personality: An Examination of the Deterrence Question, 67 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 99 (1976); Farrington, Self Reports ofDeviant
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Delinquency, 65 J. CRIM. L. & C. 545 (1974); Smith and
Stevens, Drug Use and Hustling, 14 CRIMINOLOGY 155

(1976).

confidential relationship may be nurtured, occasionally over a long period of time.
"Confidentiality" refers to the conditions under
which scientific data, acquired from or about research subjects, is used by criminologists. Confiden-

tiality concerns professional and personal ethics: a
promise or vow, explicit or otherwise, to a source
of research data not to disclose the source's identity,
or not to disclose or attribute certain facts, opinions
or beliefs of the source. Confidentiality refers to the
status of research information, and involves questions of whether and under what circumstances
research data will be transmitted by the criminologist to others, questions of maintaining the anonymity of research sources, and questions regarding
the revelation of what is learned from or about a

subject.2
A legal problem may arise concerning confidences developed during research: criminologists
can be subpoenaed by various governmental authorities and ordered to disclose information ob-

tained from or about a subject. The subpoena can
order the disclosure of the identity of the research
subject or information pertaining to the subject. A
researcher may either obey such an order and
violate a vow to the subject, or refuse to obey the
court order and suffer certain consequences, such
as imprisonment.
This legal problem is not hypothetical, as a

number of academiq researchers and their staff
have been subpoenaed in recent years.3 Several of
these researchers have been held in contempt for
This definition is based in part upon the work of one

2

of the authors, Carroll, Confidentiality of Social Science Research Sources and Data: The Popkin Case, 6 Publication of
Am. Political Sci. 268 (1973).
3 The authors have identified eighteen such subpoena
incidents involving twenty-two academic researchers and
their staff. The facts surrounding each incident were
acquired through personal and telephone interviewing
and through acquisition of all available written or published materials. For an account of the incidents, see J.
Carroll & C. Knerr, Confidentiality of Social Science
Research Sources and Data, (1976) (unpublished research
report submitted to the Russell-Sage Foundation, New
York City).
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refusal to comply with a court order.4 Three researchers have been imprisoned for refusing
to
5
breach confidential research relationships.
Clashing interests surround researcher-subject
communications: those of society in scientific data
about criminal behavior and the criminal justice
system, those of prosecutors and judicial authorities
in securing information relevant to judicial decision-making, and those of individual citizens in
preserving private spheres of activity. At question
is the unfettered conduct of scientific inquiry. Also
at question is the power of public authorities to
compel evidence which could be used to the detriment of research subjects. These clashing interests
can be quite intense in criminal justice research,
since the criminologist is often in close contact with
the major sources of subpoenas-prosecutors and
judicial authorities.
The purpose of this article is to review the evolving body of law concerning the confidentiality of
criminologist-subject communications. The case
and statutory law6 suggest that a researcher-subject
4Six individuals have been held in contempt of court
for refusing to disclose confidential research information.
In two of these incidents proceedings were terminated
without action being taken. In one of the remaining
incidents, the contempt of court conviction was overturned by a higher court. People v. Newman, 32 N.Y.S.2d
379, 298 N.E.2d 651, 345 N.Y.2d 562 (1973). In the
remaining three incidents the researchers were imprisoned.
5The three researchers are: Dr. Samuel Popkin, then
of Harvard University, and now of the University of
Texas at Austin; Ms. Carole Morgan, now associated
with the National Institute for Corrections, Denver, Colorado, and her research assistant.
6 Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Electric
Co., 71 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal. 1976). Richards concerned
the petitions of an academic researcher and his principal
research assistant to be relieved from disclosing research
notes and presenting personal testimony sought by a
party to a breach of contract and defamation proceeding.
In quashing the subpoenas, the court held that trial
courts are invested with broad discretion in supervising
discovery, including balancing the interests of the private
litigant in obtaining the information sought against the
costs of providing it.
In Newman the New York Court of Appeals held that
the administrator of a methadone research and treatment
center need not produce records to a grand jury investigating the commission of a crime. Several federal research
statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 242a(a) (1970), 21 U.S.C. § 1175(a)
(Supp. V 1975), and 21 U.S.C. §872(c) (1970) protected
said records from court ordered disclosure.
In addition to the case law, a large number of federal
and state statutes have been enacted protecting the confidentiality of certain forms of researcher-subject communications: 21 U.S.C. §872(c) (1970) (drug research
subject identities); 42 U.S.C. §242(a) (1970) (mental
health and drug research subject identities); 42 U.S.C.
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testimonial privilege is now recognized in certain
situations.7
PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED BY CRIMINOLOGISTS

Numerous incidents involving the confidentiality of criminal justice research data have occurred

§3771(a) (Supp. V 1975) (research data generated by
grantees and contractors of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice); 42
U.S.C. §4582 (1970) (records of drug search projects);
ARK. SrAr. ANN. §43-917 (1964) (information gatherer
shield law); ARK. STATr. ANN. §82-2629(c) (1976) (drug
research subject identities); CAL. HEAT:rH & SA'E'TY
CODE § 11603 (West 1975) (drug research subject identities); CONN. GEN. STA:. ANN. § 19-496(d) (West 1958)
(drug research subject identities); DEL. CODE tit. 16,
§ 4772(d) (Rev. 1974) (drug research subject identities);
GEo. CODE ANN. §79A-831(c) (Supp. 1977) (drug research subject identities); HAw. REV. STTx. § 329-58(c)
(1976) (drug research subject identities); IDAHO CODE
§37-2747(d) (1977) (drug research subject identities);
ILL. ANN. Srxr. ch. 56 , § 1508(b) (Smith-Hurd 1977)
(drug research subject identities); IND. CODE §35-24.15-8(d) (Bums 1975) (drug research subject identities);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 204-509(4) (West Supp. 1977) (drug
research subject identities); LA. REV. S-'rA. ANN. §40992(c) (West 1977) (drug research subject identities);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 52A, § 8 (Supp. 1977) (researchers
under grant or contract to the Maryland Department of
Juvenile Services); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94C,
§24(b) (West 1975) (drug research subject identities);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.023 (West Supp. 1976) (information gatherer's shield law); MoNr. REV. CODES ANN.
§93-701-4(6) (researchers studying child mentality, in
civil proceedings); MON'r. REV. CODES ANN. § 54-323(3)
(drug research subject identities); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 453.296 (1977) (drug research subject identities); N.H.
REV. SrAT. ANN. § 126-A:4-9 (Supp. 1973) (shield for
"scientific investigators" authorized by the Commissioner
of Health and Welfare); N.Y. Civ. RIGHrs LAW 79-j
(McKinney 1976) (records of the Multi-State Information Center for Psychiatric Patients, a research and demonstration data bank); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW 3371
(McKinney 1977) (records of drug research projects);
N.C. GEN. STATr. §90-113.3(e) (1975) (drug research
subject identities); N.D. CENT. CODE § 19-03.1-39(4)
(1971) (drug research subject identities); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 63, § 2-106(G) (West Supp. 1977) (drug research
subject identities); PA. STrx. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-137(c)
(Purdon 1977) (drug research subject identities); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 24-113 (Supp. 1977) (information gatherers
shield law); TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-1446(a) (1977) (drug
research subject identities); TEx. REV. Civ. STA'i. ANN.
art. 4476-15, § 5.02(c) (Vernon 1976) (drug research subject identities); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §69.50.508(d)
(Supp. 1976) (drug research subject identities); W. VA.
CODE § 60A-5-508(d) (Supp. 1976) (drug research subject
identities); Wis. SCAT. ANN. § 161.335(7) (West Supp.
1977) (drug research subject identities); Wyo. S'rxr. § 35347.52(d) (1913 bupp.) (drug research subject identities).
7 Based upon prevailing case law, researchers subpoenaed by the federal courts in connection with civil
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over the last decade. The most serious of these
ises would not justify the refusal to produce records
arose in 1976, when two researchers under sponsor- as ordered, and federal law was not controlling.
ship of the Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis- When the researchers persisted in refusing to comtration [hereinafter referred to as LEAA] to study ply with the requirements of the subpoena, they
the behavior and treatment of alleged sex-crime ,were held in contempt of court and were ordered
victims, were subpoenaed by a Colorado county
incarcerated until such time as the requirements
court and ordered to disclose the research records
were fully met. The two researchers were then
pertaining to two alleged victims. The research
taken into custody and confined to a cell in the
files were sought in connection with impending
county courthouse. The researchers' counsel loprosecution of two juvenile suspects. The researchcated the research subjects whose records were
ers declined to provide the files as ordered, con- sought, secured their written consent to disclose
tending that anonymity had been promised to all information concerning them, and then complied
research participants and that the LEAA required
with the subpoena. The researchers were subsemaintenance of confidentiality under threat of se- quently released. 9
vere penalty.8 The judge held that informal promIn another study of alleged sex-crime victims,
one sponsored by a private foundation, the principroceedings have a right to refuse to disclose confidential
pal investigator, a social psychologist, was similarly
research communications, as held in the Richardsdecision.
subpoenaed to disclose a research file to a local
Researchers who have received a legal shield under proprosecutor. The file was sought in connection with
visions of 21 U.S.C. § 872c (1970) or 42 U.S.C. § 242a(a)
the pre-trial investigation of a suspect. The social(1970) also have a right to refuse to comply with a court
psychologist refused to disclose the file on the
order, as held in the Newman decision. Other existing
legal shields, as discussed in notes 20-54 infra and accom- grounds that anonymity had been promised to all
panying text, may be protective, provided the courts
participants. When the prosecutor pledged to puruphold the applicability and constitutionality of these
sue
a contempt of court proceeding if the file were
statutes. For commentaries on this topic, see: COMM. ON
FED. EVAL. RESEARCH, PROrECING INDIVIDUAL PRI- not disclosed, the researcher threatened to destroy
VACY IN EVALUATION RESEARCH (1975); Social Research the file rather than breach a personal commitment.
in Conflict with Law and Ethics (P. Nejelski ed. 1976);
The prosecutor offered a counterthreat: prosecuRIVLIN & TiMPANE, ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF
tion for destruction of evidence should the file be
SOCIAL EXPERIMErArION (1976); Boness & Cordes,
destroyed. Believing that no legal grounds existed
The Researcher-SubjectRelationship: The Needfor Protectionand
a Model Statute, 62 GEO. LJ. 243 (1973); Carroll, supra for resisting the subpoena and that severe penalties
note 2; Feuillan, Every Man's Evidence Versus a Testimonial might be suffered if the file were destroyed, the
Privilege for Survey Researchers, 40 PUB. OPINION Q. 39 social psychologist complied with the subpoena.
(1976); Hendel & Bard, Should There be a Researcher's Three additional subpoenas were subsequently
isPrivilege, 59 AAUP BULLETIN 398 (1973); Knerr & Carroll, Social Scientists and the Courts: The Development of a sued; each required disclosure of a research file and
Testimonial Privilege, 15 SOc. Smi. J. 103 (1978); Nejelski
& Finsterbusch, The Prosecutorand the Researcher: Present and
Prospective Variations on the Supreme Court's Branzburg Decision, 21 SOC. PROB. 3 (1973); Nejelski & Lerman, A
Researcher-Subject Testimonial Privilege: What to do Before the
Subpoinu-Arrives, 1971"Wis. L. REV. 1085 (1971); Ruebhausen & Brim, Privacy and BehavioralResearch, 65 COL. L.
REV. 1184, at 1206-1207 (1965); Shah, Privileged Communications, Confidentiality, and Privacy: Privileged Communications, I PROFESSIONAL PSYCH. 56 (1969); Tyler &
Kaufman, The Public Scholar and the First Amendment. A
Compelling Need for Compelling Testimony, 40 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 995 (1972); Note, Protection from Discovery of
Reseachers' Confidential Information: Richards of Rockford, Inc.
v. Pacific Gas &Electric Co., 71 F.R.D. 388 (1977), 9 CONN.
L.R. 326 (1977); Note, Social Research and Privileged Data,
4 VAL. U.L. REV. 368 (1970).
" During oral agruments researchers referred to the
provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 3771(a) (Supp. V 1975), which
requires researchers under grant or contract to the LEAA

to protect the privacy of the subjects of research, and
immunizes such research data from judicial and administrative proceedings. Penal ties for violations prescribed
by 42 U.S.C. §3771(c) (Supp. V 1975): a fine not to

the requirements of each were fully met.'0
In another incident, a sociologist who had completed a participant-observation study of socialization patterns of new policemen was subpoenaed
to disclose all research notes and files and to testify
before a civil court investigating an alleged act of
police brutality that he supposedly witnessed. In
the proceeding arranged for such disclosure the
researcher asserted an absolute scholarly privilege
not to reval research data. No challange was made

exceed $10,000, imprisonment not to exceed one year, or
both.
' Description of this incident is based upon personal
interviews with one of the researchers and with LEAA
officials. Several months after these events transpired, the
Colorado State Attorney ordered an expungement of all
records pertaining to the proceeding. No published account is available.
10Description of this incident is based upon a personal
interview with the social-psychologist. No published accounts of the incident are known to exist.
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to this assertion and the proceedings were terminated."
In another participant-observation study of police socialization patterns, a sociologist was ordered
to testify before a police board investigating an
alleged act of brutality. Believing that all parties
would benefit from disclosure,
the sociologist com2
plied with the subpoena.'
During a study of drug users, a sociologist was
subpoenaed to testify as a defense witness for one
of the research participants. The defendant sought
substantiation for a claim that drugs were used for
religious purposes. The sociologist refused to answer certain questions on fifth amendment
grounds, claiming that criminal activity had been
witnessed (drug use) and that this activity had not
been reported to the proper authorities as required
by law.
The researcher was not compelled to tes3
tify.'

A court order is not the only form of disclosure
pressure which can be exerted upon a criminologist; informal demands can be made including
pressures which make it difficult for the criminologist to resist in the absence of legal protection. For
example, a sociologist investigated crime victimization and found that in certain areas of a large
city only a small percentage of crimes were actually
reported to the police. When a local newspaper
published an article summarizing the research findings, the police chief of the city in question publicly
disputed the results and demanded the names and
addresses of all interviewees to verify the findings.
The sociologist declined to provide this information
on the grounds that absolute assurances of anonymity had been extended to all4 participants. Pressures ceased shortly thereafter.
In another incident, research was conducted regarding the judicial and administrative handling
of motor vehicle violators. The researcher discovered that one operator had been convicted of
" The subpoena was issued in connection with a defamation action, Geiser v. Seattle Times Co., No. 776-763
and No. 778-830 (Superior Court of Washington State,
Kings County, 1974). The researcher's assertion of an
absolute privilege not to reveal confidefitial data was
made in a proceeding before Vincent F. Leahy, Commissioner, State of Massachusetts, Boston, October 30, 1974.
(Transcript on file with the authors.)
12 Description is based upon Kirkham, The Criminologist as Police Officer 30-31 (1973) (unpublished paper
delivered before the American Society of Criminology).
a Description is based upon Yablonsky, The Problems
of Deviant Research, 6 CRIMINOLOGIST 10 (1968), and upon
Universities: Risks of Research, TIME, Dec. 22, 1967, at 40.
," Description is based upon a personal interview with
the sociologist. No published accounts of this incident are

available.
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twenty-three major violations in a two-year period,
but had not experienced a suspension of driving
privileges. Mention was made of this in the final
report. When an official of the state motor vehicle

department demanded the identity of this individual, the request was refused since anonymity had
been promised to all participants. A second demand was also refused. The efforts to secure the
identity of the participant were ultimately halted. 5
In yet another incident, during an experimental
study of ex-felon behavior, one of the research
participants became a suspect in a murder case,
and police officials pressured the researchers to
provide the research files pertaining to this participant, and threatened to subpoena the researchers
if necessary. Contending that absolute assurances
of confidentiality had been made to all participants, the researchers refused to provide any information. As in the16former examples, pressures subsequently ceased.
Criminologists thus frequently experience a privacy or confidentiality problem during research,
augmented by their reluctance to cooperate, by the
pressures put on them to reveal confidential data
or by their unanticipated discovery of extremely
sensitive information. One criminologist has noted
that:
The criminologist studying uncaught criminals in
the open finds sooner or later that law enforcers try
to put him on thp. spot-because, unless he is a
complete fool, he uncovers information that law
enforcers would like to know, and, even if he is very
skillful, he cannot always keep law enforcers
from
7
suspecting that he has such information.
STATUTORY PROTECTION

One of the major approaches to extending legal
protection to criminologists is through legislative
enactment of a statute upholding the privileged
status of researcher-subject communications. Although no legislature has enacted an absolute privilege similar to that enjoyed by attorneys, by phy's Description is based upon an anonymous response
to a survey conducted by the Am. Psych. Assn., as

reported in

ETHICAL PRINCIPLES IN THE CONDUCT OF
RESEARCH WITH HUMAN PARTICIPANTS (1973).

'r Description is based upon personal interviews and
upon an account of the incident as described in an
unpublished paper, Feuillan, Every Man's Evidence:
Should There be a Testimonial Privilege for Survey
Researchers? (May 1974) (paper presented before ajoint
meeting of the American and World Assoc. for Public
Opinion Research).
17 POLSKY, HUSILERS, BEATS, AND OTHERS 147.

(1967).
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sicians and by others,s the question of such a
privilege has been reviewed.' 9 And, in recent years,
the Congress and several state legislatures have
enacted several limited privileges or immunities.'
FederalImmunity Statutes

One federal statute is applicable to research data
generated by researchers under grant or contract
to the LEAA and states that:
Except as provided by Federal law other than this

chapter, no officer or employee of the Federal Government, nor any recipient of assistance under the
provisions of this chapter shall use or reveal any
research or statistical information furnished under
this chapter by any person and identifiable to any

specific private person for any purpose other than
the purpose for which it was obtained in accordance

with this chapter. Copies of such information shall
be immune from legal process, and shall not, without the consent of the person furnishing such information, be admitted as evidence or used for any
purpose in any.action, suit, or other judicial or
administrative proceedings.21 "
The provisions of this statute are very narrow, as
protection is conferred only upon researchers under
grant or contract to the LEAA. Moreover, the
immunity extends only to written records and not
to the mental impressions of the criminologist.
Protection is not afforded against legislative sub-

poenas,2.nor is protection extended to information
'aA number of relationships have been deemed important by American legislatures, and are legally protected, in some jurisdictions, and under certain circumstances, including: attorney-client, priest-penitent, husband-wife, physician-patient, psychiatrist-patient, accountant-client, social worker-client, psychologist-client,
journalist-source, employer-stenographer, and school
teacher-student, among others. For a review of these
statutes see R. WEINBERG, CONFIDENTIAL AND OTHER
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICArION (1967) and 8 WIGMORE
ON EVIDENCE § 2290 (3d ed. 1940).

19 See Mass. State Sen. Bill No. 705 (1973);

PRIVACY
PRO'rECFION SrUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL PRIVACY
IN AN INFORMATION SOcIE'rY 567-87 (1977); Boness &

Cordes, The Researcher-Subject Relationship: The Need for
Protection anda Model Statute, 62 GEO. L.J. 243, 278 (1973);

Comm. on Fed. Eval. Research, Protecting Individual
Privacy in Evaluation Research (1975) (Nat. Acad. of
Sci.)-(Appendix B).
20See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §872(c) (1970); 42 U.S.C.
§242a(a) (1970); 42 U.S.C. §3771(a) (Supp. V 1975);

pertaining to the conduct of future crimes. 23 The
protection is also somewhat limited because state
and local judicial authorities may hold that federal
law is not controlling and that state or local law
should prevail.
Despite these limitations, the statute may provide relief to a number of criminologists-those
under grant or contract to the LEAA. Moreover,
all research data is protected, including identities
and the content or nature of what was learned
from or about a research subject, and, in contrast
to other federal researcher statutes discussed below,
the immunity is automatically conferred on all
LEAA researchers. No administrative action is necessary to implement the statute.2
Another federal statute permits the U.S. Attorney General to:
[A]uthorize persons engaged in research to withold
the names and other identifying characteristics of
persons who are the subjects of such research. Persons who obtain this authorization may not be
compelled in any Federal, State, or local civil, criminal, administrative, legislative, or other proceeding
to identify the subjects 26of research for which such
authorization obtained.
While this "privilege" appears to provide broad
coverage, the statute is embedded within a section
pertaining to drug research programs and officials
responsible for administering the immunity have
actually interpreted the statute to apply only to
drug research. a Only those criminologists investigating the relationship between drug use and crime
would therefore be conferred the immunity. Moreover, other limitations on this statute's utilization
can be noted. By the statute protection is extended
only to those researchers who have received a
specific grant of immunity and administrative review is required of pertinent documents provided
by the researcher.28
see Antipoverty R & D: Chicago Debacle Suggests Pitfalls
Facing OEO, 165 SCIENCE 1243, (1969).
23 See the administrative regulations implementing this
statute, at 41 Fed. Reg. 54845 (1976) [codified as 28

C.F.R. 22 (1977)].
2' For an illustration of this problem, see the case cited
note 29 infra.
' See, however, the regulations implementing this statute, cited note 23 infia.

11603 (West 1975);

26 U.S.C. § 872(c) (1970).
27 See the administrative regulations implementing this

TEx. REV. Civ. STATr.ANN. art. 4476-15 § 5.02(c) (Vernon 1977). These and other statutes are discussed in the
text at notes 20-54 supra.
21U.S.C. § 3771(a) (Supp. V 1975).
22 Only one incident is known of a legislative subpoena
demanding research data. For a review of this incident,

statute, at 21 C.F.R. 1316.21 (1977).
28IM 21 C.F.R. 1316.21 requires shield applicants to
submit the following information: (I) the researcher's
controlled substance registration number, if any; (2) the.
location of the research project; (3) a general description
of the research or a copy of the research protocol; (4) a

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

§
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However, in certain respects this provision provides broader protection than the LEAA statute.
Unlike the LEAA statute, under this provision both
testimony and written records are immune from
compulsory disclosure proceedings. Also, the provision does not require the researcher to be under
grant or contract to a federal agency to receive the
immunity. Finally, and perhaps most importantly
the statute has been reviewed and upheld.,
A third federal statute empowers the Secretary
of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to:
[Aluthorize persons engaged in research on mental
health, including research on the use and effect of
alcohol and other psychoactive drugs, to protect the
privacy of individuals who are the subject of such
research by withholding from all persons not connected with the conduct of such research the names
or other identifying characteristics of such individuals. Persons so authorized may not be compelled
in any Federal, State, or local civil, criminal, administrative, legislative, or other proceeding to iden0
tify such individuals.3
By this statute the legal needs of a segment of the
criminological research community may be served.
If authorized, the immunity extends to all proceedings, irrespective of level of government. Coverage
is extended to "mental health" research, which is
not explicitly defined, but determined by admin3
istrative discretion. ' The research project need not
be sponsored by the Department of Health, Edu32
cation, and Welfare. And, like the drug research
statute, this statute has been reviewed and upheld.33
Several other federal statutes provide relief from
compelled testimony. For example, the Drug Abuse
Office and Treatment Act of 1972 confers a limited
immunity on the "records of the identity, diagnosis,
prognosis, or treatment of any patient ... of any
' 4
However the
drug abuse prevention function."
immunity granted is very limited, as a balancing
specific request to withhold the names and/or any other
identifying characteristics of the research subjects; and
(5) the reasons supporting the request.
' People v. Newman, 32 N.Y.S. 2d 379, 298 N.E. 2d
651, 345 N.Y. 2d 562 (1973).
' 42 U.S.C. 242a(a) (Supp. V 1975).
3' For proposed administrative regulations implementing this statute, see 40 Fed. Reg. 56692 (1975).
j2 See the proposed regulations implementing this statute, at 40 Fed. Reg. 56692 (1975).
' People v. Newman, 32 N.Y.S. 2d 379, 298 N.E. 2d
651, 345 N.Y. 2d 562 (1973).
'4Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-255, § 408 (a), 86 Stat. 65 (1972) (Codified at
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provision has been included in the statute which
allows courts to order disclosure where there is
"good cause."3' The statutes protecting census
37
6
data3 and social security data also create immunities for and by the Social Security Administration. University-based research is not protected
by either of these statutes.

State Statutes
State legislatures have also enacted statutes
which may protect certain forms of research and
certain types of research data. However, such statutes are of limited importance as none of them
protect a broad segment of the criminal research
community.
Several state legislatures have enacted statutes
protecting research into drug abuse and "use. In
1970 the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, which contained two provisions protecting the identity of drug research
8s
subjects? The Conference urged states to adopt
the model statute and at least thirty-seven states
have now adopted the model statute or similar
versions. Of these, twenty-eight states enacted stat21 U.S.C. § 1175 (Supp. V 1975)). See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 4582 (Supp. V 1975).
35 42 U.S.C. § 4582(b)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1975).
13 U.S.C. § 9 (1970), which reads in part: "Copies
of census reports which have been so retained shall be
immune from legal process, and shall not, without the
consent of the individual or establishment concerned, be
admitted as evidence or used for any purpose in any
action, suit, or other judicial or administrative proceeding."
3742 U.S.C. § 1306 (1970).
"sPertinent provisions of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act are § 504(c):
A practitioner engaged in medical practice or research is not required or compelled to furnish the
name or identity of a patient or research subject to
the [appropriate person or agency], nor may he be
compelled in any State or local civil, criminal,
administrative, legislative or other proceedings to
furnish the name or identity of an individual that
the practitioner is obligated to keep confidential.
and § 508(d):
The [appropriate person or agency] may authorize
persons engaged in research on the use and effects
of controlled substances to withhold the names and
other identifying characteristics of individuals who
are the subjects of the research. Persons who obtain
this authorization are not compelled in any civil,
criminal, administrative, legislative, or other proceeding to identify the individuals who are the
subjects of research for which the authorization was
obtained.
HANDBOOK OF "HE NAIIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS (1970).
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utes containing one or both of the model law's
provisions protecting the identity of drug research
subjects.s9 Investigations of drug abuse are thus
protected by several federal statutes and state statutes in more than one-half of the states. Only those
criminologists investigating drug use would be protected by these statutes. Moreover, all of these
privileges are conferred upon researchers and apbe made to the proper authorities
plication must
40
in each state.

Several of the state newsmen shield laws may
protect criminological researchers. For instance,
4
Minnesota's Free Flow of Information Act ' extends protection to any "person who is or has been
directly engaged in the gathering, procuring, compiling, editing, or publishing of information for
purpose of transmissions dissemination, or publi'4
cation to the public.

2

A certain segment of the

3 States which have enacted the provision regarding
a drug researcher privilege include: Arkansas (ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 82-2629(c) (1976); California (CAL.
HEALTH & SAFEIT CODE § 11603 (West 1975); Connecticut (CONN. GEN. S'rAT. ANN. § 19-496d (West
1958)); Delaware (DEL. CODE tit. 16, §4772(d) (Rev.
1974)); Georgia (GEo. CODE ANN. § 79A-831(c) (Supp.
1977); Hawaii (HAw. REV. SrAT. § 329-58(c) (1976));

Idaho

(IDAHO CODE

§ 37-2747(d) (1977)); Illinois (ILL.

ANN. S'iwr. ch. 56 , § 1508(b) (Smith-Hurd 1977));
Indiana (IND. CODE § 35-24.1-5-8(d) (Burns 1975)); Iowa
(IOWA CODE ANN. § 204-509(4) (West Supp. 1977));
Louisiana (LA. REV. S'rA. ANN. § 40-992(c) (West
1977)); Massachusetts (MASS. LAW ANN. ch. 94C, § 24(b)
(West 1975)); Nevada (NEV. REV. Sr'r. § 453.296
(1977)); New Mexico (N. M. STAr. ANN. § 54-11-39(c)
(Supp. 1975)); New York (N. Y. PUB. HEALT'H LAW 3371
(McKinney 1977)); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. S'ir.
§ 90-113.3(e) (1975)); North Dakota (N.D. CErrr. CODE
ANN. tit.
19-03.1-39(4) (1977)); Oklahoma (OKLA. S&'Ar°i
63, § 2-106(G) (West Supp. 1977)); Pennsylvania (PA.
SrAr. ANN. tit. 35, § 780-138(c) (Purdon 1977)); Ten-

nessee

(TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 52-1446(a) (1977)); Texas

(rEx. REV. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 4476-15, § 5.02(c)
(Vernon 1977)); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 69.50.508(d) (Supp. 1976)); West Virginia (W. VA.
CODE § 60A-5-508(d) (Supp. 1976)); Wisconsin (Wis.
STATr.ANN. § 161.335 (7) (West Supp. 1977)); Wyoming

(WY. STA'r. §35-347.52(d) (Supp. 1977)).

40The authors have communicated with the various
officials responsible for conferring the shields cited at
note 38 supra, and found that relatively few of the statutes

have been administratively implemented. Most of the
state officials contacted reported that no researcher had
ever requested a shield, and thus no administrative pro-

cedures had ever been set forth. One of the states which
has implemented its shield, Montana, has reportedly
licensed two researchers in accordance with State of
Mont. Bd. of Pharmacists, Law, Rules, and Regulations
(1977).
41MINN. STAT. ANN, § 595.021-595.024 (West Supp.
1976).
42
MINN. S'rAT. ANN.

§ 595.023 (West Supp. 1976).

criminological research community might be protected under the provisions of this statute.4 3 The
newsman statute in Arkansas may also protect

certain researchers. The statute protects "any editor, reporter, or other writer for any newspaper or
periodical or manager or owner of any radio station."' Interpreted broadly, this statute could extend coverage to a small number of criminologists.45 Tennessee's newsman statute defines newsman as "a person engaged in gathering information
for publication or braodcast."" The privilege is
limited, however, by a provision which allows the
Tennessee Court of Appeals to order disclosure in
47
certain situations.

The New Hampshire legislature enacted a statute which empowers the State Commissioner of
Health and Welfare to authorize a privilege for
"scientific investigators." The statute immunizes
from compulsory disclosure "all information, records of interviews, written reports, statements,
notes, memoranda, or other data procured in connection with such scientific studies and research
conducted by the department, or by other persons,
agencies, or other organizations so authorized by
48
Under this statute, criminolthe commissioner.,
ogists could be authorized to withhold information
49
from public authorities.
Several other state statutes protect a narrow
range of research data. The New York legislature
enacted a statute protecting records of the Multi13 No criminologist has yet, to the authors' knowledge,
asserted that the provisons of MINN. STrT. ANN.
§ 594.023 extend to academic or other research. The
question has therefore not been reviewed by the courts.
44ARK. STAr. ANN. § 43-917 (1975 Supp.).
4 No criminologist has yet claimed that ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 43-917 protects communications with research
subjects. Until such time as a researcher claims such a
shield, the issue will remain unsettled.
46TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-113 (1976 Supp.).
47

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 24-115 (1976 Supp.). Disclosure

situations are:
(1) where "there is probable cause to believe that the
person from whom the information is sought has information which is clearly relevant to a specific probable
violation of law";
(2) where a demonstration has been made "that the

information sought cannot reasonably be obtained by
alternative means"; and
(3) where a demonstration has been made that there
is "a compelling and overriding public interest of the
people of the state of Tennessee in [having] the information."
48N.H. REV. STATr. ANN. § 126-A:4-a (1973 Rev.).
49No criminologist has yet requested to be so authorized. Communication with Mr. Robert E. Whalen,
Comm. of Health and Welfare, State of New Hampshire,
Sept. 23, 1977.
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state Information System for Psychiatric Patients,
a data bank used for research and demonstration
purposes.'s Moreover, Montana recognizes a privilege for researchers studying child mentality.5 '
Finally, researchers studying juvenile delinquency
under grant or contract to the Maryland Department of Juvenile Services2 are also protected from
5
court ordered disclosure.
CONsrITUTIONAL PROTEGTION
Privileges can also be created through reference
to, and extensions of, constitutional authority. In
recent years, several academic researchers have
sought to use the first amendment to the United
States Constitution as authority to resist subpoenas.
Newsmen and journalists have similarly asserted a
constitutional right not to reveal confidential information. The relevant case law thus involves
both newsmen and researchers.
The First Amendment Claim
The argument that the first amendment exempts
the production of evidence has received exhaustive
attention by legal scholars.5 3 An extended analysis

"oN.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW 79-j (McKinney 1975). For
a review of the origins of this statute, see Curran, et aL,
Protection of Privacy and Confidentiality, 185 SCIENCE 797
(1973).
5' MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 93-701-4(6) (1964). The
provision states:
Any person engaged in teaching psychology in any
school, or who acting as such is engaged in the study
and observation of child mentality, shall not without the consent of the parent or guardian of such
being so taught or observed testify in any civil
action as to any information so obtained.
s2 MD. ANN. CODE art. 52A § 8 (1974), which reads in
part:
All records, reports, statements, notes and other
information which have been assembled or procured
by the Department of Juvenile Services for purposes
of research and developement and which name or
otherwise identify any person or persons are confidential records within the custody and control of
the Department and its authorized agents and employees, and may be used only for the purposes of
research and study for which assembled or procured.
s See, e.g., Constitutional Protectionfor the Newsman's Work
Product, 6 HARV. C.R.C.L. REV. 119 (1970-71); Comments, The Newsman Privilege After Branzburg v. Hayes:
Whither Now, 64 J. CRINc L. & C. 218 (1973); Note,
ConstitutionalLaw-FirstAmendment-Privilege Not to Appear
and Testify Before Grand Jury Granted to Reporter Seeking to
Protect Sensitive Source Where Government Fails to Establish
Compelling Need-Caldwell v. United States, 46 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 617 (1971); Constitutional Law-Evidence-No Testimonial Privilegefor Newsmen, 51 N. CAROLINA L. REV. 562
(1973); Notes: Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional
Right to a ConstitutionalRelationship, 80 YALE L. J. 2 (1970).
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of the argument is not necessary here. In essence,
the claimants have argued that in gathering information, it is often necessary to agree either to shield
the identities of the sources of these articles or to
publish only part of the facts revealed. They have
further argued that if these confidences are forcibly
breached the sources will be deterred from furnishing information to the detriment of the free flow of
information guaranteed by the first amendment."'
Claimants have argued that the societal interest in
the free flow of information exceeds the interests of
prosecutors and judicial authorities in securing
information needed for litigation.
CriminalProceedings
Privilege claims based upon the first amendment, when advanced in criminal proceedings,
have not been recognized by judicial authorities.
The first researcher claims to such a right were
made by several professors subpoenaed to testify
before a federal grand jury investigating the release
and dissemination of the Pentagon Papers. An
important case involved the privilege claims of
Professor Samuel Popkin, an authority on village
life in Viet Nam.5 s In refusing to answer several
questions posed by members of the grand jury,
Popkin stated:
Any loss in a scholar's ability to obtain information
freely lowers the quality of public debate and inhibits the advancement of knowledge upon which
our society depends. When questioning a scholar
54 This is a summary of the argument used in the
leading case 408 U.S. 665 (1972). Branzburgconcerned the
petitions of three newsmen subpoenaed by grand juries
investigating alleged criminal activities in Kentucky,
Massachusetts, and California. All three argued that:
[Tlo gather news it is often necessary to agree either
not to identify the source of the information published or to publish only parts of the facts revealed,
or both; that if the reporter is nonetheless forced to
reveal these confidences to a grand jury, the source
so identified and other confidential sources of other
reporters will be measurably deterred from furnishing publishable information, all to the detriment of
the free flow of information protected by the First
Amendment.
408 U.S. at 679-80.
The court held, in four separate opinions, two concurring and two dissenting, that the first amendment does
not protect ajournalist's sources from revelation in grand
jury proceedings. Justices Burger, Blackmun, Powell,
White, and Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the court,
with Powell filing a separate concurring opinion.
s United States v. Doe, 460 F. 2d 328 (1st Cir. 1972).
For an analysis of the Popkin case, see Carroll, supra note
2.
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about matters connected with his research, the Government should demonstrate a strong need for having the questions answered. Without such a demonstration or a showing that the questions relate to
the scholar's own participation or direct involvement in the commission of a crime, a scholar should
be permitted to refuse to answer questions about his
contacts and sources. An unlimited right of grand
juries to ask any questions and-expose a witness to
citations for contempt could easily threaten
scholarly researchM
The grand jury rejected Popkin's claim of a
testimonial exemption and moved to require him
to testify. In an unpublished opinion, the federal
district court also rejected Popkin's claim, and
when he failed to testify as ordered, held him in
contempt. In reviewing the appeal of the contempt
order, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit held 7 that Popkin need not answer
all of the grand jury's questions be'cause several
were "badly phrased,"' ss but that he must answer
those questions pertaining to other scholars who
were known to be associated with the production
59
and dissemination of the Pentagon Papers. When
Popkin persisted in refusing to answer these questions, he was taken into custody and imprisoned
for eight -days.
Although the Popkin factual circumstance raised
some interesting points, the leading United States
61
Supreme Court case is Branzburg v. Hayes. Branzburg concerned the petitions of three newsmen not
to breach confidences when ordered to do so by
grand juries. All three newsmen claimed that their
ability to gather provocative news would be diminished if reporters were compelled to disclose confidential information. However, a majority of the
5 Unofficial transcript of the testimony, as published
in the HARVARD CRIMSON, March 29, 1972. Other comments made by Popkin are reported in Carroll, supra note
2, at 270.
57460 F.2d 328 (1st Cir. 1972).
w Id. at 337. (Aldrich CJ., concurring). For a listing of
the questions of contention; ee 460 F.2d at 331 and
Carroll, supra note 2, at 271.:"9The court held: "While we acknowledge that
scholars customarily discuss their work with colleagues
and in doing so may perhaps violate confidences, a
privilege which would give 'comprehensive protection to
such collateral discussions would make scholars a
uniquely privileged class in the broadest sense." 460 F.2d
at 334. The court thus.forged a limited testimonial exemption for confidential sources or research data, but not
for confidential non-sources (e.g., colleagues of researchers).
60 Popkin was released when the grand jury was discharged at the government's request.
61 408 U.S. 665 (1972).

6
Supreme Court disagreed with these claims 2 and
held that even if the free flow of information were
somewhat constrained, the public's interest in securing incriminating evidence outweighted that of
assuring the reporting of crimes to the press. As the
court noted:

[T]he grand jury's authority to subpoena witnesses
is not only historic, but essential to its task... Until
now the only testimonial privilege for unofficial
witnesses that is rooted in the Federal Constitution
is the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled.
self-incrimination. We are asked to create another
by interpreting the First Amendment to grant newsmen a testimonial privilege that other citizens do
not enjoy. This we decline to do.s
Branzburg, however, did not deny altogether the
validity of the first amendment claim. And, after
Branzburg, certain justices have gone to some pains
to specify what circumstances might warrant the
upholding of a claim. The "tests" that post-Branzburg courts have occasiona!'iy used are those that
were introduced in Branzburgin the dissenting opinions of Justices Stewart, Brennan and Marshall,
who argued that a first amendment claim should
prevail unless the government can demonstrate
(1) that there is a probable cause to believe that
' Four opinions were written by the Branzberg Court.
Justice White wrote the opinion of the Court, in which'
Chief Justice Burger, Justices Blackmun, Powell and
Rehnquist joined. These justices held that the first
amendment should not be used to create a new testimonial privilege, that the interests of society in prosecuting
crime outweighed the interests of society in news of
criminal activities, and that the various legislatures
should forge new testimonial privileges, not the courts.
Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion, in which
he emphasized the "limited nature" of the Court's holding, stating that "[t]he.Court does not hold that newsmen
... are without constitutional rights." Id at 709. Justice
Powell contended that the courts would remain a source
of balancing the freedom of the press against the obligation of citizens to give relevant testimony. Id at 710.
Justice Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, which embraced a balancing approach to the first amendment claim vis-a-vis
the public interest in the efficient administration of justice. He stated that "the government must not only show
that the inquiry is of compelling and overriding importance, but it must also 'convincingly' demonstrate that
the investigation is 'substantially related' to the information sought." Id. at 739-40. According to these Justices, none of the cases before them satisfied these "tests."
Justice Douglas wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
Id at 711-25. He stated that "there is no area of inquiry
not protected by a privilege," and that "a newsman has
an absolute right not to appear before a grand jury." Id.
at 712.
63 Id. at 689-709.
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the newsman has information that is clearly
relevant to a specific probable violation of
law; and
(2) that the information sought cannot be obtained by alternative means less destructive
of first amendment rights; and
(3) that a compelling and overriding interest in
the information exists.6
Despite the application of those tests the postBranzburg courts in an unbroken line of decisions,
have consistently held that journalists must disclose
confidential information when ordered to do so in
criminal proceedings.65
Civil Proceedingsand the FirstAmendment
The courts have consistently relieved researchers
and newsmen from complying with subpoenas
originating from civil litigants. The controlling case
is Baker v. F & F Investment Co.,6 decided shortly
after the Branzburg decision. In Baker, a journalist
was relieved from disclosing the identity of a source
used for a newspaper article on real estate practices
in Chicago. The court held that:
While we recognize there are cases-few in number
to be sure-where First Amendment rights must
yield, we are still mindful of the preferred position
which the First Amendment occupies in the pantheon of freedom ... we are of the view that there
are circumstances, at the very least in civil cases, in
which the public's interests in non-disclosure of a
journalist's confidential sources outweighs the public and private interest in compelled testimony.6'
Recognizing this necessary balance of interests, the
court then established a set of standards for determining when first amendment claims in civil litigation would prevail. Included in these standards
were questions as to whether the subpoenaed wit64

Id. at 743.

0 See Lewis v. United States, 517 F.2d 236 (9th Cir.
1975); Lewis v. United States, 501 F.2d 418 (9th Cir.
1974); Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir.
1972); United States v. Liddy, 354 F. Supp. 208 (D.D.C.
1972); In re Farr, 36 Cal. App. 3d 577, 11 Cal. Rptr. 649
(1974); Morgan v. State, 325 S.2d 40 (Fla. App. 1975);
Lightman v. State, 15 Md. App. 713, 294 A.2d 194 affd
per curiam, 266 Md. 550, 295 A.2d 212 (1972), cert. denied
411 U.S. 951 (1973); People v. Dan, 41 App. Div. 2d 687
(N.Y. 1973); In re WBAI-FM v. Proskin, 42 App. Div. 5
(N.Y. 1973); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204
S.E.2d 429 (1974); State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315
A.2d 254 (1974).
66470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
896.
67

Id. at 783.
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ness was a party to the litigation, whether there
were other sources available, whether disclosure of
the identity of a source was essential to the orderly
administration of justice and whether the identity
of the source went to the heart of the case.68
In a subsequent case, Democratic National Committee v. McCords these standards were used by a
district court to quash several subpoenas issued to
newsmen. The court determined that the newsmen
were not parties to the action, that the "parties on
whose behalf the subpoenas were not issued" had
not demonstrated that the testimony and materials
went to the "heart of the claim," that the parties
had not shown that alternative sources had been
exhausted and that there had not been a showing
by the parties of the materiality of the documents
and other materials sought.7" In several subsequent
cases, other subpoenas issued to newsmen by civil
litigants were similarly quashed on first amendment grounds by application of the Baker stan71
dards.
The first civil case involving a researcher's claim
of a first amendment-based privilege occurred in
Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas and Electric
Co.72 There, two subpoenas seeking testimony and
research notes were issued to an economist and
research assistant studying public utility decisionmaking. The economist and the research assistant
claimed that they were entitled to the privilege
upon application of Baker-like standards. The researchers noted that they were not parties to the
action and had no interest in the outcome, that
they conducted interviews under an agreement of
confidentiality, that there was no public interest
represented in behalf of disclosure, that there was
no showing that alternative sources of information
had been exhausted by the plaintiff and that there
was no showing that the testimony sought went to
the "heart of the dispute."7 3
The court accepted the researchers' claimed
standards and held that while the issues in the case
did not rise to that of constitutional status, the
force of the arguments warranted quashing both
68 Findings put into a question format.
670 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973).
Id. at 1397-98.
7'Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299 (M.D. Fla.
1975); Apecella v. McNeil, 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
7271 F.R.D. 388 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
73Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion For Order Compelling Production of Documents Pursuant to Subpoena at 16, Richards
of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
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subpoenas. The researchers were subsequently
relieved from complying with the subpoenas.
Summary
With respect to the first amendment claim, the
courts have without variance used a balancing test
and have held that the interests of society and the
administration of justice are greater in criminal
matters than in civil proceedings. The courts are
thus more likely to refuse a claim of privilege in a
criminal case and to accept the claim, where warranted, in a civil proceeding. Criminologists should
therefore weigh the necessity of avowing confidentiality to research subjects, for in the absence of
specific statutory protection, criminal justice researchers could be exposed to possible penalties for
refusing to breach confidences.
AN ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE?

Dean Wigmore, the influential authority on evidentiary rules, 75 has argued that in order for a
communicant-communicator relationship to be regarded as important to sodiety, and therefore be
legally protected, the following criteria should be
met:
(1) The communications must originate in a
confidence that they will not be disclosed;
(2) this element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance
of the relation between the parties;
(3) the relation must be one in which the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously
fostered; and
(4) the injury that would inure to the relation
by the disclosure must be greater than the
74 71 F.R.D. at 391.
75

Various commentators and couits have explicitly
recognized Dean Wigmore's criteria as controlling. See
Boness & Cordes, supra note 7; Shah, supra note 7; Slovenko, Psychiatg and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6
WAYNE ST.

L. REv. 175 (1970); Note, Social Research and

Privileged Data, supra note 7. See also Branzburg v. Hayes,

408 U.S. at 682; International Telephone and Telegraph
Corp. v. United Telephone Co. of Florida, 60 F.R.D. 177
(M.D. Fla. 1973);. Baylor v. Mading-Dugan Drug Co.,
57 F.R.D. 509 (N.D. Ill. 1972).

by the correct disbenefit thereby gained
7s
posal of litigation.
Empirical evidence is not available to determine
whether these criteria are being met by criminological researchers. Certain questions remain: Are the
interests of society in criminal justice research
greater than the interest in the correct disposal of
litigation? Under what circumstances may these
interests be lesser or greater? Is there a substantial
and continuing need for protecting researchers?
What are the sentiments of the research community? Who may claim such a privilege-the researcher or the subject? Are there circumstances in
which disclosure may be of help to subjects? How
may "criminologist" be defined for statutory purposes?
Legal authorities have on occasion elevated the
interests of the research community above those of
governmental authorities. For instance, in the Richards of Rockford case, the judge noted that "[s]ociety
has a profound interest in the research of its
scholars, work which has the unique potential to
facilitate change through knowledge."' Other case
law may be cited reflecting the attitudes ofjudicial
authorities toward scholarly researchers. 7
The various legislatures or the courts may recognize an absolute privilege for criminologists.'
Whether this occurs will in part be determined by
the actions of the research community and by the
actions of individual researchers in challenging
subpoenas.
§ 2285 (3d ed. 1940).
71 F.R.D. at 390.
See, e.g., the decisions in Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d

'68 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE
7
78

670 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356
Mass. 251, 249 N.E. 2d 610 (1969).
79The Federal Privacy Protection Study Commission,
established under provisions of The Privacy Act of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1896, considered the question. See PRIVACY PROTECrION STUDY COMMISSION,
supra note 19, at 567-87, in which the Commission recommended a testimonial exemption for federally supported researchers. A criminologist-subject testimonial
privilege statute modeled after 42 U.S.C. §37771(a)
(Supp. V 1975) has been drafted for consideration by the
Washington State Legislature (on file with the authors).

